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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of repairs of his car while traveling." However, this decision was
rendered before the enactment of the Statute3 in 1921 and which was
amended in 1923, so as to read:
"Except when making absolutely necessary repairs, no person shall
park or leave any vehicle along, upon, or within the limits of any public
highway in such a manner as to interfere with the free passage of
vehicles over and along such highway. In all cases there shall be left
a free and usable passageway of at least eighteen feet so that vehicles
going in opposite directions may pass without interference from any
standing vehicle."
Since the passage of this statute, the word "parking" in the statute
has been construed in Kaster v. Tures' to mean "the voluntary act of
leaving a car on the highway when not in use." In the instant case,
the deceased did not voluntarily leave his car parked. He was com-
pelled to make repairs. In Froehter v. Arenholts5, it was held that a
driver was not negligent "in stopping under a light at a roadside to
repair lights." Doughraty v. Tabbets6 held that an automobile opera-
tor "should be charged with the duty of observing whether any persons
are about the standing vehicle."
The case of Dare v. Boss7 held that the law "no vehicle shall be
parked upon the main traveled portion of the highway . . . . shall not
apply to any vehicle so disabled that it would be dangerous to move it."
The California case of Mitsuda v. Isbell8 holds that a person may
repair his disabled vehicle on the traveled portion of the highway so
long as he does not cause too much "inconvenience and hazard to
others."
Justice Doerfler said in the present case that the court will take
judicial notice of the fact that tire punctures occur very frequently,
and that it is dangerous to life and injurious to the car itself to drive
with a flat tire. Then the Court comes to the conclusion that tire
repairing is within the meaning "absolutely necessary repairs" for
which parking is allowed by Sec. 85.02 of our statutes.
Therefore, as long as a person does not obstruct traffic and takes
necessary precautions for the safety of others, Wisconsin holds that
one may temporarily park his vehicle on the traveled portion of a high-
way to make "absolutely necessary repairs."
J. S. FORNARY
Bankruptcy: Judgment Lien Against Partners.
The case of Liberty National Bank of Roanoke, Virginia v. Bear
et al, reported in 48 S. Ct. 252, involves a very important principle
in the law of bankruptcy.
It concerns itself with the validity of a judgment lien filed within
four months of a bankruptcy petition against a partnership, but more
than four months before voluntary petition by the partners individually.
'Wis. Sts. Sec. 85.02.
& 191 Wis. i2o; 2IO N.W. 415.
6242 Ill. App. 93.
aI2O A. 354 (Me.).
'224 Pa. 446 (Ore.).
a 234 Pa. 928.
NOTES AND COMMENT
The judgment lien, so obtained against the partnership, was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States not to be annulled as against
partners, under the Bankruptcy Act, 67c, 67f (i i USCA par 107), since
it is not essential to the adjudication of a partnership that a partner,
or partners, should be adjudged bankrupt individually.
The Supreme Court, in this decision, reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals, which decided that the "adjudication of the partner-
ship was necessarily an adjudication of the bankruptcy of the indi-
viduals composing it," and that the lien of a judgment obtained within
four months of filing of petition against the partnership was lost
by the adjudication. The Court of Appeals seems to have followed
the Old Bankruptcy Law of 1867, which did not permit the partner-
ship entity to be adjudged a bankrupt, and which declared that when
two or more persons who were partners in trade were adjudged bank-
rupt, the property of the partnership as well as the partner should be
taken over by the Bankruptcy Court for administration.
In Section 5a (ii USCA par. 23) the Supreme Court of the
United States sees a basis, in 268 U.S. 426, 431, 45 S. Ct. 56o, 562(69 L. Ed. 1028), for the following conclusion, namely, that there
"can be no doubt that a partnership may be adjudged a bankrupt as
a distinct legal entity; and if proceeded against as a distinct legal
entity, without reference to the individual partnerships, it may, as such,
under section 12a (i USCA par. 30) offer terms of composition to
the partnership creditors alone. The court then cites a long line of
cases in support of this principle.
Hence the court concludes, in reversing the decision of the Court
of Appeals, "that the involuntary petition filed against the Provision
Co., which did not in terms seek an adjudication that the Beckers
(the individual partners) as individuals, nor allege that as individuals
they were insolvent or had committed any acts of bankruptcy, was
not in legal effect a petition filed against them individually, and the
adjudication under that petition that the partnership was a bankrupt,
was not in legal effect an adjudication that they were bankrupts in-
dividually." There is hence no ground, under either section 67c or sec-
tion 67 f of the Act, for annulling the judgment liens obtained upon
their individual real estate more than eight months prior to the filing
of their voluntary petitions.
Reversed.
RAYmoND FoRD
Insurance: Proceeds of Life Policy Payable to Partnership Held
Not Exempt from Insured Debt's, Although Insured Became Part-
nership Successor.
This case involved a controversy over the avails of a life insurance
policy.' The material facts of the case are as follows: Cohen and
one Kirsner formed a partnership for the purpose of engaging in the
mercantile business. The partnership was later dissolved, Kirsner
ceasing to be a member. Cohen assumed all the firm liabilities and
remained in business as the successor of Cohen and Kirsner. The
creditors were informed of this arrangement. While the partnership
'Cohen v. Gordon Ferguson, Inc. (N.D.) 218 N.W. 209.
